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Tsung-Hsi Wang*, Tzou-Yien LinMinistry of Health and Welfare, Taipei City, TaiwanReceived 3 November 2015; accepted 3 November 2015On the night of June 27th, 2015, a tragedy occurred while
young people were celebrating the start of their summer
break at the Formosa Fun Water Park in New Taipei City,
Taiwan. At 8:32 PM, a blast caused by flammable cornstarch-
based powder injured 499 people, including nine interna-
tional tourists from five countries. Among the injured, half
suffered burns over 40% of their body surface area (BSA), and
75% suffered from second or third degree burns to>20% BSA.
The Taiwan emergency health care system encountered a
very difficult challenge, and high fatality rates were ex-
pected based on the seriousness of the injuries.
The explosion was accidentally ignited from an over-
heated spotlight on the stage in a dry swimming pool when
colored powders were sprayed over the crowd. The un-
precedented number of burn casualties caused panic in the
Taiwanese public, and also brought into question the
appropriateness of how ambulances were dispatched and
the care received in the hospitals.8:32 PM. Mass-casualty response mechanism
Immediately after the blast, the Ministry of Health and
Welfare (MOHW) activated its two Regional Emergency
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0929-6646/Copyright ª 2015, Elsevier Taiwan LLC & Formosan Medicaldesignated hospitals to recall their medical personnel and
prepare for mass burn casualties, and to report individual
patient information and the number of patients entering
each hospital. Facing the geographical limitations of the
water park and the tremendous numbers of the injured,
New Taipei and Taipei City dispatched >70 ambulances to
the scene, along with ambulances from the cities of Keel-
ung and Taoyuan, with the hospitals in these four cities
volunteering to support the rescue.
9:00 PM. Pre- and posthospital medical care
For better on-site response, the Ministry assisted in
collaboration with the hospitals to set up on-site medical
stations, and urged local health departments in these four
cities to ensure that all burn units and intensive care units
under their jurisdictions were well-prepared for the
injured. With the intense cooperation and collaboration of
fire departments and health departments, almost all of the
499 injured were sent to hospitals within an incredibly short
period within 4 hours after the blast.
11:24 PM. Hospital surge capacities motivated
by health officials
The surge capacity of emergency rooms handling the
injured was triggered in a very efficient way. It allowed
these emergency rooms to obtain adequate staff, supplies,
and equipment, as well as structures and systems to pro-
vide sufficient care to meet the immediate needs of pa-
tients following such a large-scale incident.Association. All rights reserved.
Figure 1 Numbers designating the hospitals and cities (13 cities and 54 hospitals) among the total of 193 emergency-designated
hospitals and 22 cities/counties caring for patients from the incident causing mass burn casualties. This was the largest mass
casualty event in Taiwan history.
1152 T.-H. Wang, T.-Y. LinIn addition to telephone contact, the administrative
staffs of the Ministry were stationed in the office within 2
hours of the blast for real-time monitoring of medical-
resource utilization, and to speed the control of casualties.
Minister Chiang of the MOHW visited the injured at 11:59 PM
with other officials.June 28 and after. Casualty monitoring
Suffering from severe burns combined with inhalation
pulmonary injuries, patients were unstable, and further
intensive care was required. Patients were transferred to
several hospitals with better burn-unit facilities to ensure
the best medical care. Initially, the injured were treated
in six hospitals in three cities in northern Taiwan. After
they were stabilized, patients were distributed to 38
hospitals in seven cities by the following morning, with
this distribution widened to 54 hospitals in 13 cities
nationwide after 1 week. By the end of the 1st week, due
to the less severely injured patients being discharged,
patient distribution dropped to 46 hospitals in 13 cities
(Figure 1).
During this mass casualty incident, there were initially
>230 patients reported as being critically injured. Howev-
er, there were no deaths within the first 24 hours after the
blast, which indicated the high quality of the emergency
medical capacity in this region of Taiwan. The first death
took place at 2:20 PM on June 29th, which was 42 hours
after the blast. During the 100 days following the explosion,
12 patients unfortunately passed away due to severe burns
and multiple organ failure (on October 28th, 2015, another
patient passed away, increasing the number of deaths to
13). The extremely low mortality rate has been attributed
to the excellent care, as well as the great efforts, deliveredby many agencies. The Ministry took control of the disaster
response, focusing on the need of the hospitals to ensure
high-quality patient care, supporting them with all re-
sources needed, assisting them with backup expertise,
volunteering human resources, and transferring patients.
During the 1st month, international burn-expert teams
came to Taiwan from Japan and the US to share their
expertise.
When disaster strikes, emergency physicians and nurses
as the first responders dealt with the initial and subse-
quent wave of patients.1e3 Similar to other mass casualty
incidents,4,5 assuring the surge capacity of emergency
care was the critical key to a successful rescue for the
victims. Our medical society, on which we rely when fac-
ing disasters, demonstrated their immense value to the
world.
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